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INTRODUCTION 
The invention of and subsequent advances in digital communication have 
drastically expanded the technology at a testator’s disposal for creating, execut-
ing, and safeguarding a record of testamentary intent. The expression of a mes-
sage in writing no longer necessarily entails the creation of a material form, nor 
is writing the only way to create a reviewable record of one’s testamentary in-
tent. Further, the rise of electronic signatures and face-to-face communication 
using electronic means and audiovisual technology has provided potential al-
ternatives to the traditional analog execution process. As most states have now 
adopted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and the support for remote 
online notarization is growing, testators already use some of these electronic 
processes to execute certain estate planning documents.1 
As a result of dramatic shifts in the technological landscape, electronic 
wills, or e-wills, have found their way into probate courts, legislatures, and 
most recently, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC).2 Part I of this Note pro-
vides background information regarding the traditional formal requirements for 
wills. Part II explores the shortcomings of the harmless error approach, estab-
lishing the need for legislatures to adopt e-wills legislation even in jurisdictions 
that have enacted a harmless error provision. Finally, Part III compares Neva-
da’s new e-wills laws to the recently approved Uniform Electronic Wills Act 
(UEWA) to conclude that, while Nevada should amend some aspects of its leg-
 
1  See UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, 
Draft for Approval, 2019) (“People increasingly turn to electronic tools to accomplish life’s 
tasks, including legal tasks. They use electronic execution for a variety of estate planning 
documents, including beneficiary designations and powers of attorney.”); UNIF. ELEC. 
TRANSACTIONS ACT (UETA), Practical Law Glossary Item 3-578-4607 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N) 
(“The UETA has been adopted by 47 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the 
Virgin Islands. The three states that have not adopted the UETA (New York, Illinois, and 
Washington) have all adopted similar laws making electronic signatures legally enforcea-
ble.”); Margo H.K. Tank et al., Remote Online Notarization is Here to Stay, A.B.A. (July 23, 
2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_ 
newsletters/banking/2019/201907/fa_2/ [https://perma.cc/BR3R-XM6U] (“As of early May 
2019, twenty-one states have passed and/or enacted RON laws.”). 
2  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2518 (2019); IND. CODE § 29-1-21-1 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 133.085 (2017); In re Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207, 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018); In re 
Estate of Javier Castro, 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 412, 418 (2014); A.B. 3095, 2018 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (died in the legislature); H.B. 1403, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018) 
(died in the legislature); H.R. 169, Council 22, Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2017) (died in the legisla-
ture); H.B. 277, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017) (vetoed by the Florida Governor); S.B. 40, 
2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2017) (died in the legislature); UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019) (This Act was ap-
proved at the 2019 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws but is 
still subject to revision by the Committee on Style). This note will discuss developments in 
the United States only. For the international context, see Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and 
Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1037, 1039 (1994). 
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islation in accordance with the UEWA, certain provisions of the UEWA should 
similarly mirror Nevada law. 
I. TRADITIONAL WILLS FORMALITIES 
Wills have long been defined by the legal formalities that guide their crea-
tion and execution.3 American law has traditionally recognized two types of 
wills, formal and holographic.4 These wills share two formalities. First, both of 
these instruments must exist in writing to be accepted for probate.5 Tracing its 
lineage back to the Statute of Wills of 1540, the writing requirement has histor-
ically functioned as a way to ensure that the testator’s intent is recorded at the 
time it is expressed.6 Recording an expression of testamentary intent in writing 
prior to the digital revolution entailed the creation of a material form. Accord-
ingly, statutes never expressly dictated that a will must, from its inception, exist 
in a material form.7 Nonetheless, writing as a fundamental formality created a 
material form requirement simply as a product of the technological environ-
ment. The writing constituting either a formal or holographic will has therefore 
 
3  Mann, supra note 2, at 1035; see John C. Fitzgibbons, An Analysis of the History and Pre-
sent Status of American Wills Statutes, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 293, 293 (1967) (“The device by 
which [a testator] expresses his wishes is usually called a ‘will,’ and the prerequisites which 
he must meet are usually called ‘formalities of execution[]’ . . . [T]hese technical require-
ments . . . were first explicitly stated in modern terms by the English Statute of Frauds in 
1676, later redefined by the Wills Act of 1837 and the Wills Act Amendment Act of 1852.”). 
4  WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 197 (4th ed. 2001). Roughly 
half of the states recognize holographic wills. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, 
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 198 (10th ed. 2017). In addition to these two categories of tra-
ditional written wills, two states now recognize the validity of a notarized will, which in-
volves the presence of a single notary as opposed to multiple attesting witnesses. UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(B) (amended 2008); SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra, at 197–98 
(only Colorado and North Dakota have adopted UPC’s notarized will provision). Even in 
states that do not recognize a notarized will, a notary can potentially serve as a witness. In re 
Friedman 6 P.3d 473, 475–77 (Nev. 2000) (reviewing approaches taken by other courts and 
holding that “[the notary’s] signature was sufficient to meet the requirements of an attesting 
witness,” so long as the notary affixed his signature to the self-proving affidavit in the testa-
tor’s presence). 
5  See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 198. Some jurisdictions recognize the nuncupative 
(oral) will. Id. at 217–18. As the name suggests, an oral will is not recorded in writing (or 
signed) at the time of creation. See id. at 217. Because oral wills do not comply with these 
formalities, they are allowed only under exceptional circumstances, such as “in the time of 
the last sickness of the deceased” or where the testator is a member of the armed services. Id. 
Even if these circumstances exist, courts generally require that the oral will be recorded in 
writing soon after being communicated by the testator. Id. at 198. Additionally, courts im-
pose a heightened burden of proof and require strict compliance, meaning that formal re-
quirements must be met with exactitude. Id. at 218; see infra Section II.A. As the path to le-
gal recognition is a considerably narrow one, the probate of oral wills is rare even where 
technically permitted. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra, at 218. 
6  MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 197–98. 
7  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. i 
(AM. LAW INST. 1999) (“The requirement of a writing does not require that the will be writ-
ten on sheets of paper, but it does require a medium that allows the markings to be detect-
ed.”). 
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traditionally existed as a paper record; though, in the case of holographic wills, 
there have been some peculiar exceptions.8 Second, both a formal and holo-
graphic will must be signed by the testator.9 The third formality, however, var-
ies depending on whether the will is formal or holographic. 
A formal will must be attested and subscribed by at least two witnesses in 
the presence of the testator.10 In the past, a formal will’s due execution was 
proven by witnesses providing testimony or submitting a sworn affidavit to the 
court.11 Most states now allow for the execution of a self-proving formal will, 
wherein the witnesses sign affidavits or declarations certifying that “all the 
formalities were duly performed.”12 This avoids the need to supply witness tes-
timony after the testator’s death.13 It also gives rise to a presumption of validity 
that is irrefutable absent “evidence of fraud or forgery affecting the acknowl-
 
8  See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 190, 203 (discussing the fictional case of a 
will tattooed on a young woman’s back being presented for probate and the famous, non-
fictional case of a will carved into a tractor fender being successfully admitted to probate); 
see also Clark Sellers, Strange Wills, 28 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 106, 106 
(1937) (“Wills have been presented for probate which were written on such strange objects 
as the rung of a stepladder, a match box, and even a petticoat.”). 
9  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 142, 198. 
10  MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 204, 210. Jurisdictions vary on the details—such as 
the number of required witnesses, who can serve as a witness, whether subscription is neces-
sary, how to determine whether the testator signed “in the presence” of the attesting witness-
es—but no jurisdiction requires an attestation clause. Id. at 203–05, 210–12; SITKOFF & 
DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 148, 152–58. 
11  Id. at 161. This proof requirement resulted in hardships for parties seeking to prove due 
execution in court. See Harold E. Kelley, Recording of Wills, 29 KY. ST. B.J. 14, 14 (1965) 
(“It is often an insurmountable task for an attorney to locate the subscribing witnesses to a 
will. They may have moved, their present whereabouts unknown, they may refuse to return 
to assist in proving the signature of the testator, or they may have died.”). 
12  MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 204, 211. Compare the self-proving will authorized 
by most states today with the solution advocated by Kelley in 1965. Kelley, supra note 11 
(suggesting that the testator and one or two attesting witnesses should be able to appear be-
fore the clerk of the court to execute and potentially record a will, “enabl[ing] the executor 
or his attorney to probate the document without further proof or without the necessity and 
expense of searching for the subscribing witnesses.”). 
13  MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 211–12; SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 
161; see supra text accompanying note 12 (discussing the problem identified and solution 
advocated by Kelley). While a self-proving affidavit or declaration makes the same recita-
tion as an attestation clause, the two are different in that the attestation clause is not sworn 
under oath and therefore cannot replace a witness’s testimony. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 212; SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 161. Because the content is essen-
tially identical, some states allow for a witness to sign only the self-proving affidavit or dec-
laration (a one-step process). See id. Other states prefer a more technically proper execution 
process and require that the witnesses first sign the will’s attestation clause and then execute 
the self-proving affidavit (a two-step process). Id. UPC § 2-504 provides for both alterna-
tives. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-504 (amended 2010); SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, 
at 161. Even though a witness need not testify if the process is properly carried out, it is 
“[n]evertheless . . . advisable to use as witnesses to a will persons who are likely to survive 
the testator and be able to testify if the will is contested.” MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 
205. 
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edgment or affidavit” under UPC § 3-406.14 The presumption is rebuttable in 
jurisdictions that recognize a self-proving will but have not enacted UPC § 3-
406 or adopted similar language.15 In either instance, contesting the will on 
formal validity grounds becomes more difficult. Unlike a formal will, a holo-
graphic will need not be attested.16 Instead, testators generally must record tes-
tamentary wishes in their own handwriting.17 Many states also require that the 
holographic will be dated.18 
II. E-WILLS IN THE COURTS: EVALUATING THE HARMLESS ERROR APPROACH 
A. Standards of Compliance 
One of the most salient points of scholarship within the field of wills, 
trusts, and estates over the last half century has been the movement away from 
the harsh tradition of strict compliance to the more forgiving doctrines of sub-
stantial compliance and harmless error.19 Under the traditional doctrine of strict 
 
14  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-406 (amended 2010). 
15  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 161 (citing Reeves v. Webb, 774 S.E.2d 641 
(Ga. 2015)). 
16  Id. at 198. 
17  MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 213–14. Jurisdictions vary as to the precise degree of 
handwriting required and the standards used to determine compliance. SITKOFF & 
DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 208–10 (Approximately one third of states require that the will 
be “entirely written, signed, and dated” in the testator’s handwriting; one third require that 
the will’s “material provisions” be recorded in the testator’s handwriting and do not consider 
any of the pre-printed words to provide context; finally, one third take the “material provi-
sion” approach and do allow extrinsic evidence to clarify the testator’s intent). Pennsylvania 
is the only state that allows the probate of unwitnessed wills not in the testator’s handwriting. 
MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 213 n.3. I initially intended to use the singular they 
throughout this piece. The use of singular they is not only a practical way to deal with the 
need for a singular, non-gendered pronoun, but it also avoids using “he or she,” which ex-
cludes non-binary individuals. See, e.g. Celeste Mora, What is the Singular They, and Why 
Should I Use It?, GRAMMARLY (June 1, 2018), https://www.grammarly.com/blog/use-the-
singular-they [https://perma.cc/DJ2F-3GB6]. Unfortunately, the Sixteenth Edition of the 
Chicago Manual of Style (CMS) expressly forbids the use of the singular they, and the Sev-
enteenth Edition allows for it in limited circumstances only. Kayleigh Fischietto, The Chica-
go Manual of Style on the Singular Pronoun ‘They’, (Jan. 4, 2018), https://libraries.indiana 
.edu/chicago-manual-style-singular-pronoun-they [https://perma.cc/PX2S-RMRL]. Because 
other authors in this issue were asked to revise in accordance with the CMS rule, I have 
agreed to revise my writing as well for the sake of consistency. However, as I am a member 
of the Nevada Law Journal (NLJ), I am in a unique position to advocate for a policy change 
that will allow authors who purposefully use the singular they in their writing to do so in 
pieces published in the NLJ. I am immensely grateful for the support expressed by the Editor 
in Chief and Lead Articles Editor—as well as certain faculty members at the William S. 
Boyd School of Law—in this endeavor. I am hopeful that the NLJ will adopt this policy and 
encourage other law review journals to take action on this important issue. 
18  MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 213. 
19  David Horton, Partial Harmless Error for Wills: Evidence from California, 103 IOWA L. 
REV. 2027, 2031–32 (2018) (“The harmless error rule has long been one of the few hot-
button issues in the staid field of wills.”); see John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance 
with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 492–96 (1975) (relying on Lon L. Fuller, Consid-
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compliance, a will must comply with all of the applicable statutory formalities 
in order to be successfully probated.20 Imperfect execution gives rise to a con-
clusive presumption of formal invalidity.21 Application of this doctrine prevents 
false positives, wherein a will that does not express the testator’s intent is none-
theless accepted to probate.22 The prevention of false positives comes at an ex-
pense, however. Refusing probate due to an inconsequential error in execution 
engenders false negatives, wherein the court denies the probate of a will that 
does indeed express the testator’s intent.23 Attempting to avoid the inequitable 
results of refusing probate over a miniscule mistake, some courts provided for 
ad hoc relief even before the rise of substantial compliance and harmless er-
ror.24 
In 1975, Professor John Langbein pushed back against this “relentless for-
malism” with his seminal article, “Substantial Compliance with the Wills 
Act.”25 As originally articulated, substantial compliance would forgive mis-
takes in execution when (1) the instrument expresses the testator’s intent, and 
(2) its form, while not in perfect compliance, nonetheless “enable[s] the court 
to conclude that it serves the purposes of [the required formalities].”26 Accord-
ing to Langbein, these formalities ultimately serve four functions.27 The eviden-
tiary function refers to the need to prove a will in court.28 The channeling func-
tion pertains to the need for a standardized form of expression, which aids 
testators, attorneys, and courts.29 The cautionary, or ritualistic, function and the 
protective function are both concerned with the testator.30 These functions dic-
 
eration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801–03 (1941), discussing the channeling func-
tion in contract law, and Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratui-
tous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 1–8 (1941) identifying the remaining functions) (Gulliver 
and Tilson in turn cite to the “careful functional analysis” undertaken by Philip Mechem in 
The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by 
Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 348 (1926)); Mann, supra note 2, at 1033; J. 
G. Miller, Substantial Compliance and the Execution of Wills, 36 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 559, 
559, 562–65 (1987); C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative 
Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the 
Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 257–58 (1991); John V. Orth, “The 
Race to the Bottom” Competition in the Law of Property, 9 Green Bag 2d 47, 53 (2005). 
20  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 146. 
21  Id. at 162. 
22  See id. at 146. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. at 163. 
25  Langbein, supra note 19, at 489. 
26  Id. 
27  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST. 1999); Langbein, supra note 19, at 492–97. A fifth function, the “anti-externality 
function,” has also been proposed. David Horton, Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The Frontiers of 
Estate Planning Formalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 539, 573–74 (2017) (“The idea that the Wills 
Act formalities prevent negative externalities is not entirely novel.”). This concept highlights 
the policy interest of protecting third parties. Id. 
28  Langbein, supra note 19, at 492. 
29  Id. at 494. 
30  See id. at 495–96. 
Fall 2019] WELCOMING E-WILLS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 345 
tate that testators should understand the gravity of their decision, have the req-
uisite capacity, and be free from fraud, duress, or undue influence when making 
a will.31 The substantial compliance doctrine “allows a court to deem a non-
compliant will to be in compliance with [the statutorily required formalities]” 
when these functions are fulfilled.32 
Though some states adopted a substantial compliance approach, the result-
ing doctrine did not facilitate the functional analysis promoted by Langbein.33 
Instead, states translated substantial compliance into a watered-down near-miss 
standard under which only minor deviations are considered permissible.34 In 
response to the narrowing of substantial compliance, Langbein advocated for 
the adoption of a harmless error approach, which originated in Australia.35 Un-
like the substantial compliance doctrine, the harmless error doctrine provides 
courts with the power “to excuse noncompliance if there is abundant evidence 
that the testator intended the document to be his will.”36 This doctrine therefore 
provides courts with a dispensing power, i.e. the ability to dispense with the 
formalities altogether, so long as a proponent can prove the testator’s intent by 
clear and convincing evidence.37 The functional analysis initially promoted by 
Langbein still plays an important role in determining whether to exercise this 
dispensing power.38 With Langbein’s support, this functionalist doctrine soon 
found a home in the UPC.39 The UPC’s harmless error provision has since been 
 
31  Id. at 491. 
32  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 174 (emphasis omitted). 
33  Id. at 170–72, 174. 
34  Id. at 174–75. 
35  Gökalp Y. Gürer, Note, No Paper? No Problem: Ushering in Electronic Wills Through 
California’s “Harmless Error” Provision, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1955, 1966 (2016) (citing 
John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Error in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Austral-
ia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1987)). 
36  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 174. 
37  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010) (imposing a clear and convincing evidence 
standard); Mann, supra note 2, at 1035 (The harmless error rule “permits a court to dispense 
with the formalities if it is satisfied ‘that the decedent intended the document . . . to consti-
tute’ his or her will.”). 
38  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b (AM. 
LAW INST. 1999) (“The question in each case is whether a defect in execution was harmless 
in relation to the purpose of the statutory formalities, not in relation to each individual statu-
tory formality scrutinized in isolation.”). 
39  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010); Gürer, supra note 35, at 1965–66 (refer-
ring to Langbein as “the father of the [UPC’s] harmless error rule” and indicating that the 
ULC amended the UPC to include a harmless error provision “[i]n response to Langbein’s 
insights . . . .”); see John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property Restatement and the 
Uniform Probate Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and Nonprobate Transfers, 38 AM. C. 
TR. & EST. COUNS. L.J. 1, 9 (2012); Miller, supra note 19, at 258. 
UPC § 2-503 provides that: 
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in compliance with 
Section 2-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with 
that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: 
(1) the decedent's will, 
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adopted in whole or in part by eleven states.40 This provision allows courts to 
excuse non-compliance with the signature and attestation requirements, but it 
does not permit courts to excuse non-compliance with the writing require-
ment.41 
In summary, the goal of the harmless error doctrine is to strike a balance 
between the state’s interest in fulfilling the four functions of wills formalities 
with its interest in furthering the fundamental policy behind the law of wills: 
freedom of disposition.42 While these formalities further testamentary intent by 
promoting testamentary capacity, protecting against fraud or undue influence, 
and impressing the seriousness of a testamentary act upon the testator,43 the de-
nial of probate based upon a mere oversight in the execution process under-
mines a testator’s freedom of disposition.44 Hence, if a proponent can show by 
clear and convincing evidence that the testator intended to create a will, the 
written instrument may be probated despite formal deficiencies.45 The harmless 
error doctrine is essentially an escape hatch designed to prevent false negatives 
in the probate of wills. Most states, however, still adhere to the strict compli-
ance standard, often with ad hoc exceptions.46 
B. Applying Harmless Error to E-Wills: Castro and Horton 
In 2013, an Ohio probate court approved an application to probate an elec-
tronic will in the now seminal case of In re: Estate of Javier Castro.47 After re-
fusing a lifesaving blood transfusion for religious reasons, Javier Castro decid-
ed to make a will from his hospital bed.48 He dictated and later executed an 
electronic document created on a password-protected Samsung Galaxy tablet 
while in the physical presence of his brothers, Miguel and Albie.49 Like Javier, 
 
(2) a partial or complete revocation of the will, 
(3) an addition to or an alteration of the will, or 
(4) a partial or complete revival of his [or her] formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked 
portion of the will. 
40  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 176 (California, Oregon, Montana, Utah, Colo-
rado, South Dakota, Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, New Jersey, and Hawaii have all adopted 
some version of UPC § 2-503. California and Ohio only apply the harmless error rule to at-
testation errors, and in Colorado and Virginia the rule applies to only some signature errors. 
Id. at n.56). 
41  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010); see John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless 
Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Resolution in Probate 
Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 52 (1987) (discussing the “indispensable” nature of the writing 
requirement). This reflects the UPC’s exclusion of oral wills. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 
(amended 2010) (providing for formal, notarized, and holographic wills only). 
42  See Langbein, supra note 41, at 6. 
43  See id. at 3–4. 
44  See id. at 4. 
45  See id. 
46  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 171.  
47  In re Estate of Javier Castro, supra note 2, at 418. 
48  Id. at 414. 
49  Id.  
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these witnesses later signed the electronic document using the tablet’s stylus 
tool.50 
In determining whether the e-will met Ohio’s requirements for a valid for-
mal will, the court explicitly held that the e-will constituted a writing signed by 
the testator.51 The court also indicated that the e-will had been attested and sub-
scribed in the testator’s conscious presence by two competent witnesses.52 In 
other words, Javier’s e-will met all of the statutorily required formalities of a 
formal will.53 Nevertheless, rather than holding the e-will valid as a properly 
executed formal will, the court applied Ohio’s harmless error provision.54 The 
court tethered its application of harmless error to the absence of an attestation 
clause,55 even though an attestation clause is not required under Ohio law.56 
Ohio’s harmless error provision does not adopt UPC § 2-503.57 Rather than 
supplying the probate court with dispensing power, Ohio’s statute allows for 
the excusal of imperfect compliance when the will’s proponent proves by clear 
and convincing evidence that: 
“(1) The decedent prepared the document or caused the document to be 
prepared. 
(2) The decedent signed the document and intended the document to con-
stitute the decedent’s will. 
 
50  Id. at 415. Javier’s nephew arrived at the hospital later and became a third witness. He did 
not see Javier sign, but Javier did acknowledge his signature. Id. at 414. Post-execution, the 
e-will remained in Albie’s continuous possession, and he testified that “[it had] not been al-
tered in any way.” Id. at 415. Testimony provided by other parties also showed that Javier 
understood the nature and extent of his property and natural objects of his bounty, suggesting 
that he also understood the disposition being made and relation of these three elements. Id.; 
see SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 264 (providing the elements for testamentary 
capacity). Further, three individuals not involved in the execution process testified that Javier 
told them he had signed the will, and two of those witnesses indicated that Javier had com-
municated that the e-will accurately reflected his testamentary intent. In re Estate of Javier 
Castro, supra, at 415. 
51  Id. at 416–17. 
52  Id. at 417–18. 
53  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (West 2019) (setting out the requirements for a valid 
will). Ohio does not recognize holographic wills. See id. (recognizing only oral and formal 
wills). It therefore would not have mattered if Javier had handwritten his e-will. 
54  In re Estate of Javier Castro, supra note 2, at 417. 
55  See id.; Kyle B. Gee, Beyond Castro’s Tablet Will: Exploring Electronic Will Cases 
Around the World and Re-Visiting Ohio’s Harmless Error Statute, 26 PROB. L.J. OHIO 149, 
150 (2016). 
56  Estate of Snell v. Kilburn, 846 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (“R.C. 2107.03 re-
quires only that a will be attested to by two witnesses . . . . There is no requirement that there 
be an actual attestation clause . . . .”); Graham v. Tucker, 47 N.E.2d 801, 803–04 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1942) (“If necessary, both the testimonium and attestation clauses may be disregarded 
as surplusage.”); In re Will of Reckard, 15 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 465, 471 (Wash. Cty. Ct. Com. 
Pl. 1914) (“[A]n attestation clause though advantageous, is no essential part of a will unless 
required by a statute.”). 
57  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010). 
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(3) The decedent signed the document . . . in the conscious presence of two 
or more witnesses.”58 
Without any further discussion of the facts or evidence presented, the court 
found that Javier’s tablet e-will met all of these requirements and admitted it to 
probate.59 
The Michigan Court of Appeals recently upheld a similar decision admit-
ting an e-will to probate under the harmless error rule in In re Estate of Hor-
ton.60 Prior to committing suicide at the young age of twenty-one, Duane Hor-
ton II created a “final note” using the Evernote app.61 He referenced this note in 
an undated, unsigned, handwritten journal entry that included his Evernote log-
in information.62 The electronic document stored on Evernote (the note) con-
sisted of “apologies and personal sentiments[,] . . . religious comments, re-
quests relating to his funeral arrangements, and many self-deprecating 
comments . . . [as well as] one full paragraph regarding the distribution of [his] 
property.”63 The note’s text—including Duane’s full name at the end of the 
document—was entirely typed.64 
Duane’s mother and the entity that served as Duane’s court-appointed con-
servator filed competing petitions for probate and appointment of a personal 
representative.65 The past conservator, Guardianship and Alternatives, Inc. 
(GAI), argued that the note constituted Duane’s will.66 Characterizing the note 
as a failed holographic will, Duane’s mother argued that Duane had died intes-
tate, making her his only heir.67 Following an evidentiary hearing, the probate 
court held that the note constituted a valid will under Michigan’s harmless error 
provision, which enacts UPC § 2-503 almost verbatim.68 Barely discussing the 
electronic nature of Duane’s will, the Horton court emphatically affirmed the 
lower court’s decision.69 
 
58  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.24 (West 2019). This provision is arguably not a harmless 
error provision at all, just as substantial compliance is not harmless error, but that is another 
matter for another day. 
59  In re Estate of Javier Castro, supra note 2, at 417–18. The court also suggested that “[i]f 
Javier’s will had been created in Nevada, it would have complied with state law,” but 
Javier’s e-will would not have met the requirements as passed in 2001. Id. at 418; see NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2001), amended by NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2017) (requiring, 
among other things, an “authentication characteristic,” single “authoritative copy,” and des-
ignated custodian). 
60  In re Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018). 
61  Id. at 209. 
62  Id. This journal entry existed in material, not digital, form. Id. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. Compare to Castro, which was uncontested. In re Estate of Javier Castro, supra note 
2, at 415. 
66  Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 209. 
67  Id. at 210. 
68  Id. at 210. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2503 (2019), with UNIF. PROBATE CODE 
§ 2-503 (amended 2010). For UPC § 2-503 text, see supra note 41. 
69  See Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 213–15. 
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The court explained that “[Michigan’s harmless error provision] is an inde-
pendent exception to the formalities required under [the state’s formal will pro-
vision, and it] does not require a decedent to satisfy . . . the requirements for a 
holographic will.”70 The only formality required under the state’s harmless er-
ror statute is that the instrument be a “document or writing.”71 In a less direct 
manner than the Castro court, the appellate court found that the harmless error 
provision applies to electronic documents or writings.72 The court then turned 
to review findings of Duane’s intent.73 
After cataloguing the evidence presented, the court concluded that the rec-
ord was sufficient to support the lower court’s finding that the “decedent clear-
ly and unambiguous[ly] expressed his testamentary intent in the electronic doc-
ument in anticipation of his impending death.”74 The court accordingly 
affirmed the holding that GAI had met its burden to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the document presented for probate was intended as the 
testator’s will.75 
C. The Shortcomings of the Harmless Error Doctrine as Applied to E-Wills 
As an initial matter, the probate of e-wills under a harmless error provision 
is problematic in that its application is limited by the continued prevalence of 
strict compliance.76 Further, harmless error provisions require that a will’s pro-
ponent prove validity under a clear and convincing standard.77 Reliance on 
harmless error therefore imposes a higher burden of proof simply because tes-
tamentary intent was communicated digitally. This unnecessarily burdens both 
the parties seeking probate and the courts fielding their petitions.78 Beyond 
 
70  Id. at 212. 
71  Id. The court contradicted itself slightly when stating that “no particular formalities [are] 
necessary” to satisfy Michigan’s harmless error provision and then clarifying that “any doc-
ument or writing can constitute a valid will provided that ‘the proponent of the document or 
writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the docu-
ment or writing to constitute’ . . . [t]he decedent’s will.” Id. at 211–12. (emphasis and altera-
tion in original). Because Michigan’s harmless error provision mirrors UPC § 2-503, it simi-
larly retains the writing requirement. See supra, Section II.A. 
72  Compare In re Estate of Javier Castro, supra note 2, at 416 (“[T]he document prepared 
. . . on Albie’s Samsung Galaxy tablet constitutes a ‘writing’ under [Ohio’s formal will pro-
vision]. To rule otherwise would put restrictions on the meaning of ‘writing’ that the General 
Assembly never stated.”), with Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 211–12 (emphasizing that the harm-
less error provision includes “any document or writing” and stating that “[a] will need not be 
written in a particular form” without directly addressing the electronic nature of Duane’s 
will). 
73  Id. at 213–14. 
74  Id. at 213. 
75  Id. at 215. 
76  See supra Section II.A. Only seven states have adopted harmless error in its pure form. 
Supra text accompanying note 40. 
77  E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010). 
78  See UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Ap-
proved Draft 2019) at 3; Developments in the Law, What Is an “Electronic Will”?, 131 
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these obvious and already articulated shortcomings, the harmless error doctrine 
presents significant theoretical and practical problems.79 
Because the harmless error rule retains the writing requirement that has al-
ways applied to formal and holographic wills,80 a will probated under the harm-
less error doctrine must comply with the writing requirement.81 As demonstrat-
ed by Castro and Horton, probating an e-will under the harmless error doctrine 
therefore requires reading “writing” to include electronic writings.82 However, 
if a court reads the plain language of a harmless error provision to include elec-
tronic writings, logic would seem to dictate that the writing requirement in 
formal or holographic will provisions should likewise unambiguously include 
electronic writings. Thus, both Castro and Horton arguably support the probate 
of e-wills that comply with the formalities that define formal and holographic 
wills, without reliance on the harmless error doctrine. 
The Castro court expressly held that Ohio’s formal will provision “does 
not require that the writing be on any particular medium.”83 Because Javier’s e-
will was properly signed and attested, the court hung its hat on the lack of an 
attestation clause when applying Ohio’s harmless error provision, even though 
Ohio had never before considered the absence of an attestation clause to invali-
date a formal will.84 If a testator were to include an attestation clause and oth-
erwise correctly execute her e-will, the court would be hard-pressed to find a 
reason for applying the harmless error provision, which plainly applies to wills 
that are not executed in compliance with a jurisdiction’s required formalities. 
An Ohio court would need to either engage in further judicial acrobatics to pro-
bate the e-will under harmless error or depart from Castro’s holding that elec-
tronic writings satisfy the formal will’s writing requirement. As discussed be-
low, this would likely foreclose the application of harmless error to e-wills. 
While the Horton court did not explicitly hold that the writing requirement 
includes electronic writings, its application of the harmless error doctrine was 
 
HARV. L. REV. 1790, 1797 (2018) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (recognizing that 
some proponents would have difficulty meeting this burden). 
79  Some have argued in support of the harmless error doctrine. Scott S. Boddery, Electronic 
Wills: Drawing a Line in the Sand Against Their Validity, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 
197, 212 (2012) (arguing that “[p]rotecting testators from the uncertain nature of the digital 
age while giving courts the ability to deviate from the Wills Act through the harmless error 
doctrine and recognition of electronic drafting strikes the appropriate balance between con-
venience, formality, and intent effectuation,” without addressing any of the conceptual issues 
raised herein); Gürer, supra note 35, at 1970–71 (arguing for the use of harmless error ab-
sent legislative action); Aubrey G. Smith, Note, Analyzing Holographic Wills in the Digital 
Age: Should Florida’s Antagonistic Stance be Liberalized in Light of Other Jurisdictions' 
Leniency?, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 561–62 (2018) (arguing that Florida, which 
does not recognize holographic wills, “should dispense with the Wills Act Formalities and 
allow digital holographic wills.”). 
80  See supra Section II.A. 
81  See supra Part I & Section II.A. 
82  See supra Section II.B.  
83  In re Estate of Javier Castro, supra note 2, at 416. 
84  See supra Section II.B. 
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premised on (1) the note’s non-compliance with the state’s formal and holo-
graphic will requirements, and (2) its compliance with the harmless error provi-
sion.85 Unlike the tablet e-will in Castro, Duane’s “final note” was unwitnessed 
and therefore did not meet the statutory requirements for a formal will.86 Simi-
larly, the note did not qualify as a holographic will because none of its provi-
sions were handwritten by the testator.87 Accordingly, the instrument at issue 
involved errors that prevented it from being probated as either a formal or hol-
ographic will, regardless of its electronic form.88 Nonetheless, once again, if a 
testator were to comply perfectly with these requirements when executing an e-
will, a Michigan court would be forced to either search for some mistake color-
able as a formal deficiency (such as the lack of an attestation clause) to justify 
its application of harmless error or creatively evade Horton’s implicit holding 
that e-writings satisfy the writing requirement. 
As suggested by the Castro court’s off-kilter reasoning and Horton’s si-
lence, probating an e-will by simply holding that the writing requirement is sat-
isfied by electronic writings is undesirable because it requires authorizing the 
use of e-wills on the same terms as traditional wills without legislative approv-
al.89 The Castro court’s reliance on the absence of attestation clause to move 
outside its formal will provision demonstrates that as much as the court wanted 
to allow Javier’s e-will into probate, it did not want to hold Javier’s e-will valid 
under the plain language of Ohio’s formal will statute, which would have al-
lowed for the use of e-wills on the same terms as traditional wills.90 Similarly, 
Horton’s marked avoidance of the issue suggests that the court did not want to 
hold that e-writings exist on par with material form written instruments.91 
If a court moves beyond plain language to exclude electronic writings from 
its formal or holographic will provisions in order to prevent the probate of a 
compliant e-will, this exclusion would arguably apply to the harmless error 
provision as well. Excluding e-writings from the writing requirement provided 
 
85  See In Re Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018); see also supra 
Section II.B. 
86  Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 212. 
87  Id. 
88  Because Michigan’s harmless error provision does not require a signature, the court did 
not reach the question as to whether a typed electronic signature satisfies this requirement. In 
Taylor v. Holt, a Tennessee court held that a “computer generated signature” fulfilled the 
signature requirement; however, there, the will was attested, and the witnesses saw the testa-
tor affix his signature to the document, which was then printed and executed in the tradition-
al fashion by the witnesses. Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830, 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Fur-
ther, the testator used a “stylized cursive signature,” as opposed to regular font. Id. at 831. 
89  See supra Section II.B. 
90  See discussion supra Section II.B. As noted by the court, the outcome would have been 
the same regardless of whether or not the e-will was admitted to probate because Javier’s 
family would have followed the e-will’s instructions absent a court order. In re Estate of 
Javier Castro, supra note 2, at 415–16. However, refusal to do so would have left future tes-
tators who chose to execute an e-will to rely on their family and friends to willingly affect 
the testamentary intent expressed therein. 
91  See Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 213–15. 
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for by formal and holographic will provisions is not unreasonable considering 
the history of wills formalities statutes, which originated in an era when there 
were no digital alternatives for testators creating, executing, and safeguarding 
wills. As discussed above, the problem arises in subsequently construing “doc-
ument or writing” as required by the harmless error rule.92 The UPC adopted its 
harmless error provision, Section 2-503, in 1990.93 Technology certainly was 
not as limited in 1990 as in 1540, but digital communication was nowhere near 
as prevalent then as it is today. It is unlikely that the drafters wrote, or legisla-
tures subsequently adopted, Section 2-503 with electronic documents or writ-
ings in mind.94 The same is true for harmless error rules that are more stringent 
than Section 2-503. Reading a material form requirement into the writing re-
quirement of formal and holographic will provisions could effectively seal the 
escape hatch offered by harmless error for the proponents of e-wills. 
Moreover, while resort to harmless error is better than denying probate 
when an e-will clearly expresses the testator’s intent, an approach premised on 
non-compliance with traditional formal requirements does little to foster the 
widespread use of e-wills. First, this approach does not make any space for vir-
tual presence as accomplished by the use of electronic means and audiovisual 
technology, which is crucial to fostering the use of e-wills as facilitated by 
online DIY estate planning companies.95 Additionally, because harmless error 
neither recognizes nor defines a valid e-will, it does not provide any sense of 
security for testators seeking to execute testamentary instruments that are likely 
to hold up in court.96 As a result, neither DIY estate planning companies nor 
legal professionals would rely on such a provision. Finally, the harmless error 
approach does not, and cannot, provide for a self-proving e-will.97 Utilizing a 
self-proving will avoids the need to produce witnesses at the time of probate 
and creates a presumption of validity; conversely, reliance on the harmless er-
ror doctrine requires producing clear and convincing evidence of testamentary 
intent to overcome a presumption of invalidity98. As the use of a self-proving 
 
92  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010). 
93  Gürer, supra note 35, at 1966. 
94  See Langbein, supra note 41, at 52 (“Of the three main formalities . . . writing turns out to 
be indispensable. Because section 12(2) requires a ‘document,’ nobody has tried to use the 
dispensing power to enforce an oral will. Failure to give permanence to the terms of your 
will is not harmless.”). 
95  Because the execution of notarized and formal wills requires the presence of at least one 
individual other than the testator, the success of online DIY estate-planning companies in the 
e-wills arena requires the use of virtual presence. See supra Part I. 
96  See supra Section II.A. (The harmless error doctrine allows courts to excuse noncompli-
ance with certain formalities upon a clear and convincing showing of testamentary intent; it 
does not create a set of requirements for valid e-wills). 
97  See Michael J. Millonig, Electronic Wills: Evolving Convenience or Lurking Trouble?, 45 
EST. PLAN. 27, 35 (2018) (“Harmless error statutes may allow admission of a will deficient in 
one or more of the required formalities. These other situations require more proof and a hear-
ing and ruling by the judge, which is contrary to the whole point of having a self-proved 
written will automatically admitted to probate.”). 
98  See supra Part I & Section II.A. 
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will has become standard in estate planning,99 the inability to probate a self-
proving testamentary instrument under the harmless error rule further cripples 
the use of e-wills on a large scale. 
In conclusion, the shortcomings of the harmless error approach are many 
and the benefits few. This approach pressures courts to stretch and twist wills 
statutes in an effort to do justice, reject the probate of e-wills altogether and 
thereby embrace inequitable results, or engage in what may be seen by some as 
judicial activism by recognizing e-wills on the same terms as traditional wills. 
Further, this ad hoc approach fails to answer important questions about the va-
lidity of e-wills or provide any sense of security for testators, beneficiaries, 
DIY companies, or attorneys.100 Legislatures should therefore respond directly 
to the unique concerns raised by e-wills and provide testators with the tools 
necessary to execute a valid e-will in a variety of contexts.101 
III. E-WILLS IN THE LEGISLATURE: EVALUATING THE APPROACHES OF 
LOBBYISTS AND SCHOLARS 
The story of e-wills legislation begins with the growing acceptance of elec-
tronic transactions and remote notarization.102 In 1999, the Uniform Law 
 
99  Matthew McDavitt, Trusts: Creation/Timing of Self-Proving Affidavits, NAT’L. LEGAL 
RES. GROUP, INC.: THE LAWLETTER BLOG (Sep. 18, 2017, 11:09 AM), http://www.nlrg.com 
/legal-content/the-lawletter/trusts-creation/timing-of-self-proving-affidavits [https:// 
perma.cc/UD7J-4TS5]; see James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for 
Wills, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 541, 570 (1990); Bruce H. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits and Formal-
ism in Wills Adjudication, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 41 (1985); Frederick F. Schneider, Self-
Proved Wills—A Trap for the Unwary, 8 N. KY. L. REV. 539, 542 (1981) (noting the value of 
using a self-proving affidavit in practice). 
100  Scott Boddery argues that the harmless error approach’s costs to the probate system are 
mitigated by “the overpowering benefits of satisfying clear testamentary intent,” but as will 
be discussed below, the paramount goal of giving effect to testamentary effect supports the 
adoption of e-wills legislation, as demonstrated by the ULC’s decision to create uniform leg-
islation. See Boddery, supra note 79, at 212; see also infra Part III. 
101  Joseph Grant suggests legalizing e-wills by simply expanding the formality requirements 
contained in existing wills statutes to apply to electronic writings, signatures, etc., but, as 
discussed below, legislation directed at e-wills in particular is better suited to deal with the 
particular questions of e-wills. This legislative approach brings the additional benefit of bet-
ter facilitating future revisions in light of technological changes that simply will not affect 
traditional, material form wills. See Joseph Karl Grant, Shattering and Moving Beyond the 
Gutenberg Paradigm: The Dawn of the Electronic Will, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 105, 131–
34 (2008); see also infra Part III. 
102  See Lisa Babish Forbes, Online Notaries Are Coming (And Why You Should Care), 29 
PROB. L.J. OHIO 3, 3 (2018) (describing UETA, which provides for both electronic signatures 
and notarization, as the precursor to remote notarization); Kyle B. Gee, The “Electronic 
Wills” Revolution: An Overview of Nevada’s New Statute, The Uniform Law Commission’s 
Work, and Other Recent Developments, 28 PROB. L.J. OHIO 126, 131 n.4 (2018) (“Given our 
widespread reliance on electronic signatures in the global marketplace, the growing ac-
ceptance of the harmless error doctrine, the rapid invention and adoption of new technolo-
gies, the recent introduction of remote notarization in certain jurisdictions, and the influential 
lobbying efforts of technology companies, we can expect to see more legislative activity to 
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Commission promulgated the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), 
which has since enjoyed widespread adoption, but expressly does not apply to 
testamentary instruments.103 The UETA provides for both electronic signatures 
and electronic notarization to facilitate commercial transactions.104 A mere two 
years later, Nevada became the first state to recognize the validity of e-wills.105 
However, Nevada’s 2001 e-wills statutes did not usher in an era of electronic 
wills because the restrictive requirements prevented testators from executing a 
compliant e-will.106 The primary impediment to practical application was the 
single authoritative copy requirement, criticized as a technological impossibil-
ity as recently as 2015.107 Nevada’s groundbreaking laws thus had only a nom-
inal effect, and e-wills remained stagnant in state legislatures for over a dec-
ade.108 
Then, in 2012, Virginia became the first state to authorize remote online 
notarization (RON), which “allow[s] the person requesting the notarization and 
the notary public to participate in the ceremony even when they are not in each 
other’s physical presence.”109 Backed by the steady lobbying efforts of notary 
associations and online notary companies, such as NotaryCam and Notarize, 
RON laws have since gained momentum, creating the need for uniform model 
legislation.110 This call has been answered by the Mortgage Bankers Associa-
tion (MBA) and the American Land Title Association (ALTA), which finished 
 
modernize laws governing the creation, execution, and storage of wills, trusts, powers of at-
torney, and other estate-planning documents.”). 
103  Forbes, supra note 102. In 2000, Congress enacted the Electronic Signatures in Global 
and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN), which similarly does not apply to testamentary in-
struments. Id. 
104  See id. 
105  Developments in the Law, supra note 78, at 1807. 
106  Gerry W. Beyer & Claire G. Hargrove, Digital Wills: Has the Time Come for Wills to 
Join the Digital Revolution?, 33 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 865, 898 (2007) (“[T]he Nevada statute, 
passed more than six years ago, has never been implemented and it is unlikely that it will 
ever be used unless the requirements are relaxed.”); Dan DeNicuolo, The Future of Electron-
ic Wills: States are Slow to Adopt Them, and Lawyers are Even Slower to Take Advantage of 
Laws Allowing Them, 38 BIFOCAL 75, 78 (2017) (Written before the passage of AB 413, the 
article notes, “[t]hough electronic wills have been legal in Nevada since 2001, they are ex-
ceptionally rare. So rare in fact that Nevada estate attorneys are seemingly unanimous when 
stating on their firms’ websites that they have never dealt with an e-will.”). 
107  Jasmine Banks, Note, Turning a Won’t into a Will: Revisiting Will Formalities and E-
Filing as Permissible Solutions for Electronic Wills in Texas, 8 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY 
PROP. L.J. 291, 301–02 (2015). 
108  Gerry W. Beyer & Katherine Peters, Sign on the [Electronic] Dotted Line: The Rise of 
the Electronic Will 1–3 (Feb. 23, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=3278363 [https://perma.cc/42EU-WF4P]) (“In early 2017 and thereafter, 
several state legislatures considered bills on electronic wills.”). 
109  Gee, supra note 102, at 127. 
110  Id. at 127–128; see Forbes, supra note 102; Tank et al., supra note 1 (“As of early May 
2019, twenty-one states have passed and/or enacted RON laws.”). 
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drafting model legislation in 2017, as well as the ULC with its 2018 Revised 
Uniform Law on Notarial Acts (RULONA).111 
The successful passage of RON laws revitalized the e-will in state legisla-
tures, as DIY online estate planning companies harnessed their lobbying efforts 
for e-wills legislation that authorizes virtual presence as conceived in the RON 
context for the execution of testamentary instruments.112 Indeed, the 2017 e-
wills laws passed by the Nevada legislature were drafted and lobbied for by 
Willing.com.113 The bill containing these amendments, AB 413, pertained not 
only to e-wills, but simultaneously made the UETA as enacted in Nevada ap-
plicable to testamentary instruments and authorized electronic notarization via 
the newly renamed Electronic Notarization Enabling Act.114 Because these laws 
were drafted by a company with a pecuniary interest in the authorization of e-
wills, they are unsurprisingly more broad than the recently approved UEWA. 
These models diverge in their approaches to providing for the formal valid-
ity of e-wills in three important respects.115 First, while the UEWA retained the 
 
111  REVISED UNIF. LAW ON NOTARIAL ACTS (RULONA) at 127 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2018); MODEL LEGISLATION FOR REMOTE 
ONLINE NOTARIZATION (MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N & AM. LAND TITLE ASS’N, Model Bill 
2017); Forbes, supra note 102; Gee, supra note 102, at 127. 
112  See Boddery, supra note 79, at 198–99; see also Gee, supra note 102, at 127 (“The first 
new influence [behind the e-wills movement] is the diligent work of financially-motivated 
entrepreneurs and owners of technology and software companies in the DIY online estate 
planning sphere, such as Willing (owned by Bequest, Inc.) and LegalZoom); Developments 
in the Law, supra note 78, at 1808. These companies, with their powerful lobbyists, are be-
hind the current pressure to change the historical law of wills to enable citizens to create, 
sign, and store estate planning documents entirely online without the need for physical pres-
ence interaction with any other person during the entire process including legal counsel.”). 
113  See DeNicuolo, supra note 106, at 78; see also Letter from Michael Delgado, Gen. 




114  A.B. 413, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. 3–8, 19 (Nev. 2017). 
115  Another importance difference between the UEWA and Nevada law is their choice of 
law provisions. This difference is not explored fully because it does not directly bear on will 
formalities. Yet, Nevada’s approach is so bold that it requires at least some attention. 
Nevada law dictates that an e-will “executed or deemed to be executed in or pursuant to the 
laws of this State may be proved and letters granted in the county in which the decedent was 
a resident at the time of his or her death or the domicile or registered office of the qualified 
custodian exists.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 136.185 (2017). Under Nevada law, an e-will may be 
deemed to be executed in Nevada or pursuant to its laws when: 
(1) The person executing the document states that he or she understands that he or she is execut-
ing, and that he or she intends to execute, the document in and pursuant to the laws of this State;  
(2) The document states that the validity and effect of its execution are governed by the laws of 
this State;  
(3) Any attesting witnesses or an electronic notary public whose electronic signatures are con-
tained in the document were physically located within this State at the time the document was 
executed in accordance with this section; or  
(4) In the case of a self-proving electronic will, the electronic will designates a qualified custodi-
an who, at the time of execution: 
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writing requirement for all electronic wills, Nevada’s amendments nixed the 
requirement altogether.116 Second, unlike Nevada’s recently amended e-wills 
laws, the UEWA does not provide for a holographic e-will.117 Quite the contra-
ry, the UEWA gives states the option to restrict e-wills to those that are attested 
by witnesses “each of whom is a resident of a state and physically located in a 
state at the time of signing and who signed . . . in the physical presence of the 
testator.”118 Third, the two models employ markedly different requirements for 
the execution and probate of a self-proving e-will.119 These statutory schemes 
should learn from each other. Both Nevada law and the UEWA should strike a 
balance in the removal of the writing requirement. Further, the UEWA should 
at least give states the option to recognize a holographic e-will as Nevada law 
 
(I) If a natural person, is domiciled in this State; or 
(II) If an entity, is organized under the laws of this State or whose principal place of business is 
located in this State. 
Id. § 133.088(e). Thus, a testator need not have any connection to Nevada, other than the 
utilization of a Nevada qualified custodian in order to probate her e-will in Nevada. Unlike 
the UEWA’s approach, Nevada’s approach represents a radical divergence from the status 
quo. 
Under traditional rules, a court has primary jurisdiction if the testator was domiciled there at 
the time of death, and ancillary jurisdiction if the testator owned property in that jurisdiction 
at the time of death. In most states, probate courts have discretion as to the acceptance of 
jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 314 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1971); A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING: DRAFTING, COMPLIANCE, AND 
ADMINISTRATION STRATEGIES 6, 65 (Jeffrey A. Schoenblum ed., 2000). A court with ancil-
lary jurisdiction over personal property will often postpone action when a will has already 
been admitted for probated in the primary (domiciliary) jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 314 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1971); A GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING, supra, at 6. This abstention reflects respect for the prin-
ciple of comity, under which states relinquish jurisdiction in recognition of another state’s 
authority to adjudicate the matter. A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING, supra, at 
65; Comity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“ ‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is nei-
ther a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, 
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the 
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to interna-
tional duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are 
under the protection of its laws.”) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64, (1895)).  
Nevada courts are unlikely to honor this jurisdictional provision. Instead, the courts are like-
ly to exercise their discretion in rejecting probate jurisdiction out of respect for the founda-
tional principle of comity. Thus, Nevada e-wills law should likely be amended to reflect the 
UEWA’s choice of law provision (section 4) and the jurisdictional provision should be re-
moved entirely so that the probate court’s jurisdiction over e-wills is exercised in the same 
manner as its jurisdiction over traditional wills. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 136.010, 136.260 
(2019). 
116  Compare UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5(a)(1) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085(1)(b)(1) (2017). 
117  Compare UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5(a) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085(1) (2017). 
118  UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5(a)(3)(A) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS, Approved Draft 2019). 
119  Compare UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS, Approved Draft 2019), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086(1) (2017). 
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does. Finally, Nevada law should amend its self-proving e-will requirements to 
reflect the approach taken by the UEWA. 
A. Removal of the Writing Requirement 
In passing AB 413, the Nevada legislature boldly went where no legislature 
has gone before: casting aside the writing requirement entirely and without im-
posing a higher burden of proof.120 Somewhat surprisingly, Nevada’s jettison-
ing of this elemental requirement has received little scholarly attention.121 Thus, 
even though legal commentators have dedicated an impressive number of key-
strokes to exploring whether electronic wills can meet the functions of Wills 
Act formalities,122 the question as to how well unwritten e-wills in particular 
serve the policies that underlie those traditional formalities remains a fairly 
open one. 
 
120  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086 (2017). 
121  See Robert I. Aufseeser, What Writings Are Adequate to Qualify for Probate?, 45 EST. 
PLAN. J. 30, 32 (2018) (noting the uniqueness of Nevada’s e-wills statute without discussing 
its removal of the writing requirement); Boddery, supra note 79, at 199–201, 204, 210–11 
(laying out Nevada’s new laws without calling attention to removal of writing requirement 
and suggesting that the writing requirement is indispensable for its evidentiary and caution-
ary function without directly addressing its removal under Nevada law); Gee, supra note 
102, at 128 (claiming that the first controversial aspect of NV e-wills laws is its authorization 
of an “authentication characteristic” e-will because “under Nevada’s new law, it appears that 
a private video recording by the testator, could constitute a valid will” without recognizing 
that the removal of the writing requirement applies to all e-wills); DeNicuolo, supra note 
106, at 78 (recognizing the existence of AB 413 without discussing the removal of the writ-
ing requirement); Beyer & Peters, supra note 108, at 3 (laying out Nevada’s e-wills require-
ments without highlighting removal of writing requirement). But see Beyer & Hargrove, su-
pra note 106, at 875–86 (exploring the policies behind the writing requirement at length, 
discussing the evidentiary uses of audio recordings and videotapes, and noting arguments 
that a videotaped will may constitute a “writing” under the UPC, but still without directly 
addressing the removal of the writing requirement because written prior to 2017 amend-
ments); Gerry W. Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony–Preventing Frustration 
of the Testator’s Final Wishes, 15 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 54–55 (1983) (arguing that videotaped 
wills satisfy the policies behind the writing requirement). 
122  See Boddery, supra note 79, at 208–11; Christopher J. Caldwell, Should “E-Wills” Be 
Wills: Will Advances in Technology be Recognized for Will Execution?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 
467, 479, 481–84 (2002) (arguing that “technology would [often] serve the functions of the 
will formalities significantly better than many valid holographs,” and discussing three poten-
tial solutions for the authorization of e-wills, i.e. abolishing the formalities, substantial com-
pliance, and harmless error); Grant, supra note 101, at 118–20, 124, 131 (advocating that 
states “follow Nevada’s lead” to provide the testator with electronic options without sacrific-
ing the evidentiary, cautionary, protective, and channeling functions); Horton, supra note 27, 
at 551, 563, 568–69, 571, 573–75 (2017) (proposing a movement away from the “intent par-
adigm” and suggesting that an alternative “anti-externality function” justifies refusal to rec-
ognize e-wills at this point in time); Millonig, supra note 97, at 27–28, 31–35 (providing a 
brief history of wills law, including the functions of formalities, and arguing against the 
adoption of e-wills in light of their inability to adequately fulfill these functions); Banks, su-
pra note 107, at 312–16; Developments in the Law, supra note 78, at 1791–92 (proposing 
three categories of e-wills and providing a functional analysis thereof). 
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Unlike the Nevada legislature, the ULC decided to retain the writing re-
quirement for e-wills.123 Retaining the writing requirement finds support in the 
channeling and cautionary functions, but this retention does not need to be ab-
solute. In essence, a balance should be struck between the complete extin-
guishment featured in Nevada’s laws and the complete survival promoted by 
the current UEWA draft. This balance entails two, non-mutually exclusive so-
lutions: (1) the writing requirement should be removed for all holographic e-
wills (but retained for formal and notarized e-wills),124 and (2) the harmless er-
ror rule as applied to e-wills should excuse non-compliance with the writing 
requirement. 
As Nevada has not adopted a harmless error provision, the second solution 
does not apply to its e-wills law. Additionally, since only about half of the 
states provide for holographic wills and only eleven have adopted some version 
of the harmless error rule, the UEWA would provide these solutions as options. 
Indeed, even jurisdictions that recognize traditional holographic wills or em-
brace harmless error may nonetheless be hesitant to probate non-written e-
wills. The ability to opt in would not significantly undermine the uniformity of 
the UEWA because the probate of holographic wills and invocation of harmless 
error arises under exceptional circumstances only, i.e. neither represent the 
norm, and jurisdictions already vary considerably as to the liberality and details 
of their formality requirements for holographic wills and their harmless error 
provisions.125 
1. The UEWA Should Provide for Non-Written Holographic E-Wills, but 
Nevada Should Limit its Removal of the Writing Requirement to 
Holographic E-Wills 
In his seminal article, “Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act,” Lang-
bein began his discussion of the purposes of Wills Act formalities with the 
claim that “the entire law of wills derives from the premise that an owner is en-
titled to dispose of his property as he pleases in death as in life,” and the for-
malities aim to ensure that a testator’s estate “really is distributed according to 
his intention.”126 In other words, freedom of disposition is the foundational pol-
icy in wills law much as freedom to contract is a core underpinning of contracts 
law, and both wills and contracts require adherence with certain formalities that 
 
123  UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5 cmt. requirement of a writing (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Draft for Approval 2019) (requiring a text record) (“An au-
dio or audio-visual recording of an individual describing the individual’s testamentary wish-
es does not, by itself, constitute a will . . . . However, an audio-visual recording of the execu-
tion of a will can provide valuable evidence concerning the [will’s] validity. . . .”). 
124  As argued in the following sub-section, the UEWA should include an optional holo-
graphic e-will provision. See infra Section III.B. Because Nevada authorizes the probate of 
holographic e-wills but has not adopted the harmless error doctrine, it should amend its e-
wills laws to limit the removal of the requirement to the holographic e-wills already recog-
nized under NRS § 133.085. See supra Section II.A. 
125  See supra Part I. 
126  Langbein, supra note 19, at 491–92. 
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derive from the Statute of Frauds to serve the evidentiary, channeling, caution-
ary, and protective policies that in turn further the freedom to control one’s 
property.127 
Langbein recognized, however, that not all functions (or formalities) are 
created equal.128 Wills law is fundamentally different than contract law not only 
in its non-commercial nature, but also because, absent ante-mortem probate, the 
will is proved when the individual whose expectations should be given effect is 
now dead.129 The evidentiary function is accordingly particularly important in 
wills law, and the primary function of the Wills Act formalities is therefore ev-
identiary.130 The writing requirement has historically served this function by 
“assur[ing] that ‘evidence of testamentary intent be cast in [a] reliable and per-
manent form.’ ”131 Unlike written wills, non-electronic oral wills are “especially 
deficient” in their fulfillment of this function.132 However, because technology 
has advanced quite a bit since 1540, and even since 1975 when Langbein pub-
lished his seminal article, the writing requirement is no longer indispensable for 
its evidentiary function. 
Though subordinate to the evidentiary function, the channeling and cau-
tionary functions are more important than the protective function.133 The writ-
ing requirement serves the channeling function by promoting the use of stand-
ardized language and methods of expression that are clearly associated with 
wills.134 A testator could arguably read a standardized script and accomplish the 
 
127  See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 804 (1941); Ashbel 
G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 5, 
14–15 (1941); Langbein, supra note 19, at 490, 492–96; Philip Mechem, The Requirement of 
Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 
21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 351 n.24 (1926) (quoting A.W. Scott, Conveyances upon Trusts not 
Properly Declared, 37 HARV. L. REV. 653 (1924)). 
128  Langbein, supra note 19, at 492 (“Several discrete functions can be identified and as-
cribed to the formalities; however, we shall see that in modern practice they are not regarded 
as equally important.”). 
129  Ashbel G. Gulliver and Catherine Tilson explicated the “Dead Man’s policy” in their 
similarly seminal article which proceeded and influenced Langbein’s piece, wherein he 
coined the term. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 127, at 4; Langbein, supra note 19, at 501. 
130  Id. 
131  Id. at 492–93. 
132  Id. at 493. These oral wills must be later reduced to writing, yet because they are orally 
communicated and the later recording is fashioned from the witnesses’ recollection of the 
testator’s oral expression, non-electronic oral wills are not comparable to electronic holo-
graphic wills that are recorded at the time of expression, either in a text or audiovisual (or 
simply audio or visual) record, and therefore are not “deficient” in their fulfillment of the 
evidentiary function. For oral will requirements, see discussion supra Part I in n.5. 
133  See Langbein, supra note 19, at 494–97 (this hierarchy is reflected not only in the order-
ing of the formalities, but the assertion that the channeling function is particularly important 
in the wills context as compared to contracts law, the defense of the cautionary function due 
to the lack of the “wrench of delivery,” and the borrowed characterization of the protective 
policy as a “historical anachronism”) (quoting Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery 
in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. 
L. REV. 341, 348 (1926)). 
134  Id. at 494. 
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same result, but the language of wills, like most legal terminology, is not well-
suited for oral expression, especially by laypersons unfamiliar with these 
terms.135 While the use of any particular language is not necessary to the crea-
tion of a formal or notarized will,136 lawyers and DIY companies alike often 
rely on formal legal language to ensure that the document is clearly recogniza-
ble as a will.137 The standardization accomplished by written forms facilitates 
the probate process, preventing false negatives and preserving judicial re-
sources.138  
Some holographic wills, particularly those that do not result from the testa-
tor filling out a standardized form, do not serve the channeling function particu-
larly well because their forms likely do not employ standard language and their 
executions do not carry the mark of “a virtually unmistakable testamentary 
act,” i.e. the involvement of witnesses or a notary.139 Granted, written expres-
sion arguably encourages clarification of thought, as testators (hopefully) write, 
re-read, and revise as necessary,140 but the same may be said for non-written 
recordings, which a testator may review, delete, and re-record. 
Almost fifty years ago, Langbein argued that writing serves the cautionary 
function because “talk is cheap,” and without the writing requirement, a testator 
“may make seeming testamentary dispositions inconsiderately, without ade-
quate forethought and finality of intention.”141 Langbein provided the example 
of an individual simply stating, “I want you to have the house when I’m gone,” 
seemingly in the context of a casual conversation.142 Importantly though, Lang-
bein maintained that “[m]ore important than the requirement of written terms is 
that of written signature,” which is excusable under harmless error.143 As rec-
ognized by Langbein, even a written expression may be “merely a preliminary 
draft, an incomplete disposition, or haphazard scribbling.”144 Indeed, it is fore-
seeable that instead of a casual conversation, the testator mailed a casual letter, 
or more likely today, sent an informal email or text.145 
 
135  See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 
53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 913, 945 (2013) (discussing the need for legal draftsmanship under the 
current testamentary process and advocating a simplification of both language and process 
by drawing on the income tax system and commercial products that facilitate the filing of tax 
returns, which would remove the attestation requirement but retain the writing and signature 
requirements because they “increase the reliability of wills”). 
136  Again, no jurisdiction requires the use of an attestation clause for a formal will. This is 
not true for a self-proving will, which does require a declaration or affidavit. 
137  Beyer & Hargrove, supra note 106, at 879 (discussing how standardized language 
demonstrates to courts that the testator did in fact possess testamentary intent). 
138  Id. at 880. 
139  Langbein, supra note 19, at 494. 
140  Beyer & Hargrove, supra note 106, at 879. 
141  Langbein, supra note 19, at 495. 
142  Id. 
143  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (Amended 2010); Langbein, supra note 19, at 495. 
144  Id. 
145  Ironically, a seemingly casual letter could be probated today in one of the jurisdictions 
that recognize holographic wills, whereas a formal electronic document most likely would 
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The attestation requirement of a formal will also serves the cautionary 
function by “[making a will’s execution] into a ceremony impressing the partic-
ipants with its solemnity and legal significance.”146 Because a holographic will 
is not attested, this ceremonial aspect is markedly absent. Thus, as noted by 
Langbein, “[a] principal objection to holographic wills is that they serve the 
cautionary function poorly.”147 With a quick nod to Kimmel’s Estate,148 Lang-
bein concluded that “[n]ot all holographs are so problematic,” suggesting that 
the benefits of accepting holographic wills for probate outweigh the costs.149 
Because holographic wills do not serve the channeling or the cautionary 
functions particularly well, but are nonetheless authorized under the UPC and 
by a slight majority of states, neither of these functions offers a sufficient justi-
fication to retain the writing requirement for holographic e-wills.150 As demon-
strated by this functional analysis, clinging to the writing requirement for the 
holographic e-will finds little support in the policies behind Wills Act formali-
ties. Rather, unqualified adherence to the writing requirement this far into the 
digital revolution seems primarily a “historical anachronism.”151 
The unifying policy of freedom of disposition supports the removal of the 
writing requirement for holographic e-wills. In contract law, agreements gov-
erned by the Statute of Frauds can be enforced under the equitable concept of 
promissory estoppel even if they were made orally and never recorded in writ-
ing.152 As a non-written recording’s satisfaction of the evidentiary function is 
sufficient to overcome the dead man problem, it is simply inequitable to force 
intestacy upon the few testators who may utilize non-written electronic record-
ings to create rare unwitnessed e-wills in jurisdictions that recognize material 
form holographic wills to avoid false negatives in similar situations. The 
 
not be accepted for probate unless the jurisdiction has either a harmless error provision or e-
wills laws. 
146  Langbein, supra note 19, at 495. 
147  Id. 
148  In re Kimmel’s Estate, 123 A. 405, 405–07 (Pa. 1924). A famous case in which the court 
accepted for probate “a short, half-literate letter to two of [Kimmel’s] sons” that was simply 
signed “Father.” SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 199; Langbein, supra note 19, at 
495. 
149  Id. at 496. 
150  The protective function simply does not apply to holographic wills at all: “Because they 
lack attestation, holographic wills make no pretense of serving the protective function. ‘A 
holographic will is obtainable by compulsion as easily as a ransom note.’ ” Langbein, supra 
note 19, at 497. A non-written electronic recording actually may serve the protective func-
tion better than the writing requirement in the case of a holographic e-will, as it provides a 
record of the testator’s general disposition at the time when the testamentary expressions are 
being recorded. See Beyer & Hargrove, supra note 106, at 884 (discussing the value of vide-
otaping an execution ceremony). 
151  See Langbein, supra note 19, at 496–97 (explaining how the protective policies, of which 
the writing requirement is a part, were recognized during the ancient beginnings of testamen-
tary documents). 
152  E.g., Davis v. Nelson, 880 S.W.2d 658, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (“Missouri recognizes 
several exceptions [to the statute of frauds], one of which is promissory estoppel.”). 
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UEWA should therefore be amended to allow for the digital communication of 
testamentary intent in these exceptional situations. 
Alternatively, the writing requirement should be preserved for formal and 
notarized e-wills because the writing requirement does indeed serve the chan-
neling and cautionary functions for these e-wills.153 Like their material coun-
terparts, formal e-wills are likely to be more routinely created and probated 
precisely because they represent the institutional norm (and also because they 
carry the potential to be self-proving), so it is valuable to promote and facilitate 
the use of standard forms. Though notarized e-wills may not enjoy widespread 
adoption, considering only two states currently recognize the validity of nota-
rized wills, the notarial act benefits from a written, standardized form, as 
demonstrated by the proliferation of fillable estate planning documents, such as 
beneficiary or guardian designations, durable or healthcare powers of attorney, 
and advance medical directives.154 Similarly, when considered in conjunction 
with the attestation or notarization requirement, the act of executing a written 
document imbues the electronic execution ceremony with formality, just as it 
does for an in-person ceremony. Since the writing requirement furthers more 
than the evidentiary policy in the context of formal and notarized wills, it 
should be retained for formal and notarized e-wills.155 Nevada should amend its 
e-wills laws accordingly.156 
2. The UEWA Should Excuse Non-Compliance with the Writing 
Requirement 
Even in the context of a formal or notarized e-will, the satisfaction of the 
writing requirement is no longer the only reliable and widely accessible way to 
 
153  Much has been made of the potential for alteration of electronic records in general, in-
jecting new grandeur into the protective function, but audio-visual records are arguably more 
difficult to alter than text records, so this function hardly justifies its retention, especially 
since the formalities do not serve the protective function particularly well even in the context 
of attested or notarized wills. Langbein, supra note 19, at 496. 
154  UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT prefatory note (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
L., Draft for Approval 2019). 
155  While notarized wills are not widely accepted, suggesting that jurisdictions adopting 
UEWA may choose not to recognize notarized e-wills, the writing requirement should simi-
larly apply because the premise underlying the notarized will is that an individual authorized 
to undertake notarial acts essentially replaces the attesting witnesses in observing the testator 
execute the will, and the notarial act becomes a formality marker in the same manner as the 
act of attestation. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (Amended 2010) (grouping attested and 
notarized wills). 
156  Nevada employs two separate provisions for formal and holographic wills. NEV. REV. 
STAT. §§ 133.040, 133.090 (2019). A single provision is used for e-wills, but this provision 
could separate attested and notarized e-wills from holographic e-wills, much as UPC § 2-502 
separates attested and notarized wills from holographic wills. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 133.085 (2017), with UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2010). The language of NRS 
§ 133.085 would remain substantially similar; however, “in writing” would simply be added 
to the introductory requirements for attested and notarized wills and remain absent from the 
language introducing holographic e-wills. 
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fulfill the evidentiary function. It is subsequently no longer indispensable.157 
Although the ULC Drafting Committee did not provide a comment explaining 
its decision to retain the writing requirement in its harmless error provision, it 
does indicate in a comment to the proposed provision governing execution that 
“writing emphasizes seriousness of intent.”158 This suggests that the Committee 
retained the writing requirement for its connection to the cautionary function. 
However, UPC Section 2-503 excuses both the signature and attestation re-
quirements upon a clear and convincing showing that the instrument presented 
for probate is a will.159 These requirements are as vital as—if not more vital 
than—the writing requirement to the channeling and cautionary policies fur-
thered by formal wills.160 
As discussed above, holographic wills do not serve the channeling function 
well because, despite being recorded in writing, they do not involve “a virtually 
unmistakable testamentary act.”161 Even if an attested will is handwritten by a 
layperson who does not utilize typical testamentary language or form, the mere 
act of having the will attested communicates to the court that the document be-
ing presented for probate is a will.162 The attestation requirement is therefore 
more effective than the writing requirement in serving the channeling function. 
To a lesser degree, the same is true for a signature, which demonstrates that the 
document is not simply a draft or note to oneself.163 
Similarly, as noted earlier, the signature requirement serves the cautionary 
function better than the writing requirement.164 Further, while less important 
than the signature requirement in this context, attestation serves the cautionary 
requirement because, as a crucial part of the formal execution ceremony, the act 
of attestation communicates to testators the “solemnity and legal significance” 
of the testamentary act being undertaken.165 Once again, despite the primacy of 
the signature and attestation requirements in satisfying the channeling and cau-
tionary functions, the UPC treats both as excusable. 
In the case of e-wills then, courts should similarly be given the power to 
dispense with the writing requirement upon a showing of clear and convincing 
evidence that the record submitted for probate expresses the testator’s intent.166 
As harmless error requires intensive factual inquiry and applies in an ad hoc 
manner, this alteration will avoid false negatives in a narrow range of cases, ra-
 
157  Contra Langbein, supra note 41, at 52 (Langbein, a member of the Drafting Committee, 
initially defended the writing requirement as “indispensable” for its evidentiary function). 
158  UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5 cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS, Approved Draft 2019) (requirement of a writing). 
159  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (Amended 2010). 
160  See supra Section II.A. 
161  Langbein, supra note 19, at 494. 
162  Id. at 495. 
163  Id. 
164  Id. 
165  Id. 
166  This may be accomplished by simply substituting the term “electronic record” for “text 
record” in the harmless error provision contained UEWA’s current draft. 
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ther than altering the status quo. This is similar to the proposal that holographic 
e-wills should not be subject to the writing requirement in that its effect is min-
imal, as the application of harmless error represents the exception, not the 
norm. These alterations will not lead to a flood of litigation or an abundance of 
non-written e-wills any more than the authorization of traditional holographic 
wills or enactment of a conventional harmless error rule.167 
B. The UEWA Should Recognize the Holographic E-Will Created under 
Nevada Law 
Unlike the UEWA, Nevada recognizes a holographic e-will.168 Under Ne-
vada law, the holographic e-will must be dated, signed by the testator, and in-
clude an “authentication characteristic of the testator.”169 Nevada defines “au-
thentication characteristic” as “a characteristic of a certain person that is unique 
to that person and that is capable of measurement and recognition in an elec-
tronic record as a biological aspect of or physical act performed by that per-
son.”170 The Nevada statute provides several examples: “a fingerprint, a retinal 
scan, voice recognition, facial recognition, video recording, a digitized signa-
ture.”171 These examples are merely illustrative, as the provision clarifies that 
“authentication characteristic” may also refer to “other commercially reasona-
ble authentication using a unique characteristic of the person.”172 
Nevada does not explicitly label its “authentication characteristic” e-will as 
a holographic e-will.173 Still, because the testator’s inclusion of an “authentica-
tion characteristic,” i.e. something unique to the testator, de-necessitates the 
presence of any other individuals for the execution process, the “authentication 
characteristic” e-will authorized by Nevada essentially creates an electronic an-
alogue to the traditional holographic will.174 In other words, the “authentication 
characteristic” requirement mirrors the handwriting requirement because it acts 
as a substitute for the attestation requirement by providing evidence of genu-
 
167  See Langbein, supra note 41, at 51–52. 
168  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2017). Like UEWA, Nevada also recognizes formal and 
notarized e-wills. Compare id., with UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019). Interestingly, Nevada does not rec-
ognize material form notarized wills. Nevada law should arguably be amended to validate 
notarized testamentary instruments in both material and electronic form. RON requirements 
are more stringent than the requirements for in-person notarization as a result of the limita-
tions of virtual, as opposed to physical, presence. If a state is comfortable with the execution 
of e-wills using RON, the refusal to recognize wills notarized in the testator’s physical pres-
ence makes little sense. 
169  NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  Under the 2001 e-will laws, an “authentication characteristic” was required for all e-
wills. Id. Assembly Bill 413 expanded the definition of “authentication characteristic” to in-
clude video recordings and other commercially reasonable forms of authentication. A.B. 
413, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. 12 (Nev. 2017). 
173  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085. 
174  See id. 
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ineness.175 The value of recognizing a holographic e-will retraces the value of 
recognizing a traditional holographic will. The holographic e-will expands the 
ways in which testators can unilaterally execute an inexpensive testamentary 
instrument and provides for the use of technology when the testator is faced 
with extreme circumstances. 
The holographic e-will provides for the single-handed execution of ‘fill in 
the blanks and sign on the dotted line’ electronic documents.176 By using pro-
grams that allow her to fill out these e-documents, attach an electronic signa-
ture and date, and include an “authentication characteristic,” a twenty-first cen-
tury testator can execute an electronic will without legal counsel, without 
witnesses, without notarization, and without ever leaving the privacy of her 
home.177 The holographic e-will bestows validity upon this unilateral process, 
just as the holographic will “[brought] an unattested printed-form will, execut-
ed in private on a sheet obtained from a stationery store, drugstore, or gasoline 
station . . . within the Wills Act.”178 
Even if a jurisdiction approves the non-written holographic e-will, compa-
nies will likely use the written form that requires the testator’s signature, thus 
serving the channeling function.179 These unilateral executions also serve the 
cautionary function. If a testator purchases a program labeled, for example, 
Turbo Wills, it seems reasonable to assume that she understood her act as a tes-
tamentary one. This is especially true because these programs are extremely 
likely to include disclosures describing the legal effect of the e-document being 
 
175  See Langbein, supra note 19, at 493, 498. 
176  Reid Kress Weisbord promotes a similar concept in his 2012 article, “Wills for Every-
one: Helping Individuals Opt. Out of Intestacy,” wherein he argues, among other things, that 
the attestation requirement should be abolished entirely and “the state should provide com-
plimentary software akin to the commercial ‘TurboTax’ program.” Weisbord, supra note 
135, at 880–81. Adopting a holographic e-wills provision is considerably less drastic than 
completely eliminating the attestation requirement, and private companies, like TurboTax, 
will undoubtedly take advantage of such a provision, eliminating the need for government 
action. See above, discussing the importance of lobbying by estate planning companies in 
kicking of the recent e-wills feeding frenzy. It would perhaps be ideal if the government or 
interest groups provided free services, as is done for the preparation of tax returns, but this is 
not particularly pressing in the context of wills since the reality is that those who cannot af-
ford even the less expensive alternatives to traditional legal counsel likely own a negligible 
amount of property anyway. This is not to suggest that wills law should only be concerned 
with property of high monetary value, but in those instances, it is less likely that disputes 
will arise regarding the proper heir. 
177  The creation and execution of a will is an inherently private act, and the ability to com-
plete a testamentary act without sharing intimate details with unknown lawyers, witnesses, 
and notaries may appeal to some testators who would otherwise be hesitant to execute a will. 
178  Langbein, supra note 19, at 511. 
179  In discussing the holographic will’s fulfillment of the channeling function, Langbein not-
ed that “[t]he danger that holographic wills can impair the channeling function of the Wills 
Act is actually minimized under the UPC provision. Like the will substitutes that the Code 
seems to be imitating, the unattested printed-form wills it invites serve the channeling policy 
especially well.” Id. at 512. 
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created and executed.180 Considering the available technology, these programs 
would allow for the execution of a holographic e-will in a way that continues to 
serve, and may in fact better serve, the handwriting requirement’s authenticity 
function.181 
The legal recognition of holographic e-wills also provides for situations 
wherein the testamentary act stems from some pressing emergency or the pos-
sibility of death created by the testator’s undertaking a potentially dangerous 
course of action.182 Devices capable of producing text, audio, visual, and audi-
ovisual recordings—such as cell phones, smart watches, tablets, laptops, and 
smart speakers—are readily accessible for many potential testators.183 Indeed, 
in certain settings, some of these devices are likely more accessible than a pen 
and paper. Many people—especially young individuals who are likely to draft a 
will as a response to an emergency or immediate concern about their well-
being—carry a smart phone at all times.184 If holographic wills exist, at least in 
part, to provide individuals with a way to dispose of their property when death 
is imminent, probable, or unusually possible, it makes little sense to forbid tes-
tators from using technology that is readily accessible. 
Technology is not only pervasive in terms of physical possession, but also 
reliance.185 If a 21st century testator was presented with the options of carving a 
 
180  Companies should take precautions to ensure that the testator reads these disclosures. 
They should not resemble or be conflated with terms of service, the language should be sim-
ple, and the most important parts emphasized with large, bold, capitalized text. 
181  Smith, supra note 79, at 557–61. As suggested by Weisbord, this is likely true for holo-
graphic e-wills as well, and even when this is not the case, as observed by Smith, the utiliza-
tion of neither an attorney or DIY company likely stems from necessity created by emergen-
cy, lack of necessity due to a small estate, inability to pay, or discomfort with formal 
systems. 
182  See id. at 552–53; see also SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 203–04 (discussing 
wills made “in extremis” and conditional wills). 
183  See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/mobile [https://perma.cc/95SP-2JQT]. 
184  See id.; see also Weisbord, supra note 135, at 903 (discussing the psychology of procras-
tination and noting that “[w]hen the task relates to an event in the distant future, nonperfor-
mance has a lesser immediate impact and is therefore more susceptible to delay”). 
185  See Gee, supra note 55, at 151 (adopting a critical stance toward the Castro court’s claim 
that Javier and his family “did not have any paper or pencil” and posing these rhetorical 
questions: “Was there really no paper or pen available in the hospital within reasonable 
reach? Did Javier and his brother even ask or was their first instinct to start writing electroni-
cally on the tablet? With so much of their lives reliant on hand-held technology, will young 
adults and millennials today take the same actions as Javier and his brothers?”); Millonig, 
supra note 97, at 31 (ignoring the growing reliance on technology when noting: “One might 
wonder why Castro did not call a lawyer to come to the hospital and prepare a will for him 
. . . Of course, this costs the client money. Castro was certainly not poor, as evidenced by the 
items listed in his will. Even if he was, there are legal aid societies, bar association pro bono 
programs, and will forms available online or from a bookstore. It should not have been that 
difficult for someone to find a printer or one of these free will forms.”); Mobile Fact Sheet, 
supra note 183. 
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writing into a tractor or recording a note or video on a cell phone,186 it seems 
exceedingly unlikely that the testator would choose the former over the latter, 
unless intimately familiar with wills law.187 Similarly, it is foreseeable that a 
testator on the way to the airport or heading into surgery would send a text or 
email using a mobile phone, as opposed to creating and signing a handwritten 
note.188 Technology facilitating digital communication is ubiquitous in modern 
life. If the law of wills recognizes this in providing for attested and notarized e-
wills, even though these executions are planned in advanced, it should surely 
recognize this fact of modern life in the case of holographic e-wills as well. 
In light of these considerations, and because the UPC gives states the op-
tion to recognize traditional holographic wills,189 the UEWA should provide 
states with the ability to recognize holographic e-wills.190 
C.  Nevada’s Self-Proving E-Will Provisions Should be Amended to Align 
with the UEWA 
Nevada’s 2017 amendments and the UEWA both provide for a self-
proving e-will.191 Like a traditional self-proving will, a self-proving e-will must 
incorporate declarations or affidavits executed by the attesting witnesses before 
an individual authorized to administer oaths under the applicable law.192 Unlike 
Nevada, the ULC differentiates between e-wills executed under conditions like 
those of Castro, where the attesting witnesses are physically present, from e-
wills witnessed via virtual presence.193 The latter is optional, so states may 
 
186  This is assuming she had no service, otherwise she could simply use her phone to call for 
help. 
187  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 203 (discussing the famous tractor fender will 
case). 
188  Smith, supra note 79, at 542 (discussing a client who sent his lawyer a text before going 
into surgery in order to convey that he intended to revoke his formal will and expressing his 
testamentary intent). 
189  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2010); Langbein, supra note 19, at 491 (noting 
that the UPC “makes liberal provision for holographs”). 
190  The revision to UEWA should mirror the structure of UPC § 2-502, while adopting the 
language employed by Nevada. To make the holographic e-will requirements more stringent, 
the Drafting Committee could adopt the “authentication characteristic” definition as used by 
Nevada in 2011 as opposed to 2017. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085(6)(a) (2001), 
amended by NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2017) with NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085(5)(a) 
(2017). If handwriting is sufficient to show genuineness, surely a fingerprint, retinal scan, 
voice recognition, facial recognition, or digitized signature would also suffice. Importantly, 
the “authentication characteristic” requirement would be dispensable under UPC § 2-503. 
191  NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086 (2017); UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019). 
192  NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086; UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019). For self-proving will requirements, 
see supra Part I. 
193  UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, 
Approved Draft 2019). Unlike the self-proving will provided for under UPC § 2-504, which 
may be made self-proving during or after execution, an e-will may not be made self-proving 
any time after execution. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-504 (amended 2010), with 
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choose to provide for a self-proving e-will when the witnesses are in the testa-
tor’s physical presence only. Where the execution ceremony is undertaken re-
motely, thus increasing the likelihood that testators and witnesses will be hun-
dreds or even thousands of miles apart, the ability to use a self-proving e-will is 
especially important, as it allows for the probate of an e-will without the need 
for an attesting witness to appear before the court. 
In addition to the traditional requirement that witnesses execute declara-
tions or affidavits, Nevada also imposes a “qualified custodian” requirement for 
self-proving e-wills.194 To be self-proving, the e-will must designate a qualified 
custodian and remain “at all times under the custody of a qualified custodian” 
prior to probate.195 The relatively stringent requirements for a self-proved e-
will represent the flipside to Nevada’s otherwise liberal approach. Unlike testa-
tors or other parties in possession of an e-will, a qualified custodian is respon-
sible for an electronic record that must include: (1) a visual record, such as a 
photograph, of the testator and attesting witnesses at the time of execution; (2) 
a photocopy, photograph, fax, or other visual record of documentation that 
“provides satisfactory evidence of the identities of the testator and the attesting 
witnesses”;196 and (3) an audiovisual recording that captures the execution cer-
 
UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Ap-
proved Draft 2019). 
194  NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086 (2017). 
195  Id. Because continuous custody is required, the new provision addresses how to transfer 
custodianship if either the custodian or the testator choose to terminate their relationship. See 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.310. If a qualified custodian wishes to terminate the custodianship, a 
written thirty-day notice of termination must be provided to the testator and, if applicable, 
the successor qualified custodian. Id. If there is no successor custodian, the appropriate rec-
ords and the certified paper original must be delivered to the testator. Id. As NRS 133.086 
mandates the continuation of custodianship, this would presumably extinguish the e-will’s 
self-proving character. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086. If designating a successor, the quali-
fied custodian must provide that individual or entity the electronic record and an affidavit 
certifying certain details regarding the custodian’s proper designation and handling of the 
electronic record. NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.310. The testator may also terminate custodianship 
by demanding that the certified original be provided or designating a successor qualified cus-
todian. Id.; NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.330. Regardless of whether termination is initiated by the 
qualified custodian or the testator, Nevada law requires properly transferring the electronic 
record to a third party if the testator wishes to retain the e-will’s self-proving character. See 
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 133.086, 133.310. 
196  NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.320. This includes “documentation of the methods of identifica-
tion used [to electronically notarize the e-will or related affidavits in compliance with Neva-
da law].” Id. An electronic notary may undertake a notarial act if the testator or witness: 
(a) Is personally known to the notarial officer; 
(b) Is identified upon the oath or affirmation of a credible witness who personally appears before 
the notarial officer; 
(c) Is identified on the basis of an identifying document which contains a signature and a photo-
graph; 
(d) Is identified on the basis of a consular identification card; 
(e) Is identified upon an oath or affirmation of a subscribing witness who is personally known to 
the notarial officer; or 
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emony.197 Though these requirements technically describe the “duties of [a] 
qualified custodian,” by dictating the content of an e-will’s electronic record, 
they impose additional formality requirements for a self-proving e-will. 
The Nevada self-proving e-will also imposes safeguarding requirements, 
perhaps to overcome concerns about the security of an electronic record. The 
qualified custodian must store the electronic record in “a system that protects 
electronic records from destruction, alteration or unauthorized access and de-
tects any change to an electronic record.”198 By minimizing the potential for 
fraudulent alteration, the expansion of safeguarding procedures furthers the 
protective function more rigorously than traditional wills formalities, which 
begin with creation and end with execution.199 
Finally, the Nevada self-proving e-will is limited by who may serve as a 
qualified custodian. First, to become a qualified custodian, “[a] person must ex-
ecute a written statement affirmatively agreeing to serve as [such].”200 Thus, a 
testator cannot unilaterally designate a qualified custodian, but must obtain the 
custodian’s express consent, thereby foreclosing the existence of an inadvertent 
qualified custodian.201 This means that storing an e-will using services like 
DropBox or GoogleDocs extinguishes its self-proving character, even if there 
were six witnesses physically present at the time of execution and all of them 
executed declarations. Second, tracing the policy concerns underlying disinter-
ested witness requirements, heirs and beneficiaries cannot serve as qualified 
custodians.202 This effectively eliminates those close to testators from taking 
charge of an e-will without extinguishing its self-proving character. 
By creating an incentive to execute a formal e-will, both Nevada law and 
the UEWA encourage the use of an attested, as opposed to a notarized or holo-
graphic, e-will. This is consistent with the traditional self-proving will. The 
qualified custodian requirements contained in the Nevada 2017 amendments, 
however, represent a significant alteration to the status quo by imposing addi-
tional formal requirements for a self-proving e-will’s electronic record,203 as 
well as extensive safeguarding requirements for a self-proving e-will.204 These 
deviations from the status quo are neither justified nor desirable. 
 
(f) In the case of a person who is 65 years of age or older and cannot satisfy the requirements of 
paragraphs (a) to (e), inclusive, is identified upon the basis of an identification card issued by a 
governmental agency or a senior citizen center. 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 240.1655 (2015). 
197  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086. 
198  NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.320(2). 
199  For the failure of existing formalities to further the protective policy, see supra Section 
II.A. 
200  NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.300(1). 
201  See Developments in the Law, supra note 78, at 1807. 
202  NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.320(1). 
203  NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086. 
204  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 133.300–133.340. For traditional self-proving will requirements, see 
supra text accompanying note 13. 
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While the inclusion of records establishing the identities of the testator and 
witnesses, as well as an audiovisual record of the execution ceremony may be 
advisable, it should not be required. Notaries public are already required by law 
to record identifying information.205 Further, practicing attorneys have long 
recognized the benefit of recording the execution ceremony, and therefore un-
dertake this recording voluntarily when anticipating a contest.206 The DIY 
online estate planning companies seeking to facilitate the execution of e-wills 
may similarly expend this effort voluntarily. The real-world value of recording 
the execution ceremony is therefore a sufficient incentive, and mandatory re-
cording should not suddenly be required for self-proving e-wills when it is not 
mandatory for traditional self-proving wills. 
The safeguarding requirements imposed under Nevada law find some sup-
port in the evidentiary and protective functions because they guard against the 
fraudulent alteration of electronic records.207 This justification is ultimately un-
persuasive though. Wills law has never imposed explicit requirements dictating 
the manner in which a will is maintained during the testator’s life in order to 
serve the evidentiary function.208 Instead, the law relies upon testators, or in 
some instances their lawyers, to keep their wills in a safe location.209 As a re-
sult, concerns about authenticity are addressed when contestants of a will en-
deavor to provide evidence of fraud.210 Further, like the formalities, safeguard-
 
205  NEV. REV. STAT. § 240.120 (2017). 
206  See Beyer & Hargrove, supra note 106, at 884. 
207  Modernizing the Law to Enable Electronic Wills, WILLING, https://willing.com/learn/ 
modernizing-the-law-to-enable-electronic-wills.html [https://perma.cc/PS7X-RFJP] (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2019) (“If the law were to accept electronic wills alongside paper wills, it would 
be important for judges to be able to identify the ‘original’ electronic record of the testator’s 
will. This can be accomplished using current technology, in one of two ways: (1) by a statu-
tory framework providing a safe harbor for the creation and storage of electronic documents 
by a reliable custodian, or (2) using document security technology to track access and altera-
tions to electronic wills bearing electronic signatures.”). 
208  See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 197. 
209  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 162. While the UPC does allow testators to de-
posit a will with the clerk of the probate court prior to death, this provision is rarely utilized. 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-515 (amended 2010); SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 
162. In some instances, the reliance on testators to safeguard their own wills has resulted in 
the inability to locate the will after the testator’s death. Id. at 161. This may be an even more 
prominent problem for e-wills nestled in the testator’s computer files, but this concern does 
not justify imposing additional safeguarding requirements for testators to reap the benefits of 
a self-proving e-will, which necessitates that an e-will has in fact been located and presented 
for probate. 
210  See, e.g., In re Hollenbeck’s Will, 318 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1969) (“[T]he 
contestants have the burden of proving fraud and undue influence”) aff’d sub nom. Matter of 
Hollenbeck, 325 N.Y.S.2d 736 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). A traditional attested will is not free 
from fraudulent alteration post-execution, as pages prior to the signature page, which typical-
ly include the actual dispositions made, may be changed and re-affixed to the signature page. 
Additionally, the signatures and notarization for a self-proving will could theoretically be 
forged. Accordingly, “courts examine paper originals for markers of authenticity (such as ink 
signatures) and evaluate any suspicious circumstances concerning their creation and stor-
age.” Modernizing the Law to Enable Electronic Wills, supra note 207. Electronic docu-
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ing does not protect against fraud or duress affecting the original testamentary 
act.211 
The evidentiary and protective functions as unconvincing justification sug-
gests that the primary importance of a self-proved e-will remaining in the cus-
tody of a qualified custodian may reflect the self-interested source of Nevada’s 
2017 amendments—which were drafted by Willling.com, a subsidiary of an 
online estate planning company, Bequest, Inc.212 The qualified custodian re-
quirements ensure the involvement of estate planning companies in maintaining 
the most desirable type of e-will recognized under Nevada law. This is true re-
gardless of whether the self-proved e-will is executed using services provided 
by a DIY company or the services of lawyers, who would likely contract with a 
third party rather than take on the qualified custodian title themselves. Because 
Nevada’s “qualified custodian” requirements likely flow from the desires of 
self-interested private parties rather than from legitimate concern for the testa-
tor, Nevada’s self-proving e-will provisions should be amended to mirror the 
UEWA approach.213 
CONCLUSION 
The law of wills is changing to make space for the increasingly important 
role of technology in the everyday lives of the testators it aims to serve. Several 
courts have relied on harmless error to probate e-wills in the absence of legisla-
tive action, but this solution is not well-suited to handle the probate of e-wills. 
Considering the shortcomings of harmless error, the ubiquity of technology that 
allows testators to move beyond the constraints of an analog execution process, 
and the development of e-will processes within the wills and estates industry, 
legislatures should move swiftly to authorize the use of e-wills. This move will 
be made infinitely easier by the finalization of the UEWA, which will provide 
the benefit of uniformity and promote the recognition of e-wills in an effort to 
 
ments are susceptible to similar authenticity analysis. Id. (discussing the use of metadata to 
determine whether an electronic document has been altered). 
211  While courts continue to assert that a function of the formalities is to safeguard against 
fraud, as explained by Gulliver and Tilson in 1945, the formalities are deficient in fulfilling 
the protective function. See, e.g., Pickens v. Estate of Fenn, 251 So. 3d 34, 38 (Ala. 2017) 
(“[T]he purpose of requiring the signature of two witnesses ‘is to remove uncertainty as to 
the execution of wills and safeguard testators against frauds and impositions’ ”) (quoting 
Culver v. King, 362 So. 2d 221, 222 (Ala. 1978)); In re Estate of Holmes, 101 So. 3d 1150, 
1152– 53 (Miss. 2012) (“The[] formalities associated with attesting a will are important . . . 
as safeguards against fraud by substitution of a different will than the one signed by the tes-
tator.”); Langbein, supra note 19, at 496–97. 
212  DeNicuolo, supra note 106, at 78. 
213  See Grant, supra note 101, at 135 (“In this debate, we must ask ourselves what is more 
important: the ability of the attorney to advise and counsel their estate client, or that client’s 
capacity to express their true testamentary wishes?”). This rhetorical question applies equally 
to the ability of DIY companies to entrench themselves in the requirements for a self-proving 
e-will. The fundamental principle of wills law is freedom of disposition. The pecuniary in-
terest of companies like Bequest Inc. should not dictate the requirements for a self-proving 
e-will. 
372 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1  
further testamentary intent, rather than as a way to respond to the lobbying 
pressure being exerted by DIY online estate planning companies. 
Though the ULC offers an arguably more neutral statutory scheme, the ef-
forts of the DIY online estate planning industry should not be dismissed out of 
hand. The ULC should reconsider its approach in light of the benefits offered 
by Nevada law. Similarly, the Nevada legislature should amend some aspects 
of its e-wills laws to reflect the recently approved UEWA. Like the law of 
wills, the law of e-wills should exist to serve the fundamental policy of freedom 
of disposition. This goal is best served by striving for an equilibrium that bal-
ances the diverse needs of testators—some of whom may wish to adhere to tra-
dition, some of whom may want to embrace the tools of DIY online estate 
planning companies, and some of whom may need to express their testamentary 
intent with whatever tools are available to get the job done. 
